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1. BACKGROUND 
 
Until the mid 1980s, progress within the European Community towards a Common Transport 
Policy was extremely slow.  Essentially the reason for this was that key members, such as France 
and Germany, had heavily regulated road haulage, bus and air sectors, both with the aim of 
protecting their rail systems and of protecting domestic operators from foreign competition. New 
entry into the industries, fares and services were all strictly controlled. Some steps were taken 
towards harmonisation of the terms of competition and regulation of subsidies, and international 
transport within the community became easier - for instance permits for international road 
haulage within the community became more readily available. However, in 1985 the Commission 
was taken to the European Court of Justice for failing to achieve a Common Transport Policy. 
Since then progress has been much more rapid, with measures towards the ‘completion of the 
market’ involving transport extensively. Road haulage and air transport have essentially been 
deregulated throughout the Union, so that the barriers which prevented an operator based in one 
member state from operating to or through another have largely disappeared. Trans European 
Networks have been planned for all modes of long distance transport, and a start made on funding 
the most urgent requirements, particularly in High Speed Rail, where previously the main 
developments had been at the national level. Yet major problems remain. Amongst the key 
problems are the implementation of pricing policies which achieve a level playing field between 
the modes and across member states, and reform of the railway and local public transport sectors. 
We will concentrate on these issues in this paper. For a general  review see Kiriazidis (1994). 
 
The next section provides a brief review of  the development of EC rail policy. We then turn 
explicitly to the issues of pricing of rail infrastructure and services, before examining the 
empirical research evidence on what efficient pricing in this sector would mean for rail traffic.  
We then examine what has happened in practice in terms of rail reform within the EU before 
reaching our conclusions. 
 
2. DEVELOPMENT OF RAIL POLICY 
 
For many years, railways in most of Europe have been seen as a problem.  They have steadily 
lost market share and required high increasing levels of subsidy (on average in recent years of the 
order of 50% of total cost). The response of the Commission to this situation was to encourage 
governments to reorganise railways as autonomous commercial bodies (in a number of countries 
the railways were still run directly by government departments), with separate and realistic 
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accounts and with social obligations minimised but appropriate recompense paid where such 
obligations were maintained. Governments were not to interfere with market mechanisms by 
providing subsidies to railways except under specific conditions.  Three regulations were critical 
in this process.  These were: 
 
1191/69 on Public Service Obligations 
  
It is under this regulation that in general the largest sums of money were paid, both for 
obligations to operate particular services and for tariff obligations either in general or regarding 
particular groups of travellers.  
 
1191/69 on Normalisation of Accounts 
 
Under this regulation, railways were compensated for elements of cost which other modes do not 
have to bear.  French railways received a contribution to general infrastructure costs under this 
heading. 
 
1107/70 On Aids to Transport 
 
Generally, this regulation covered obligations excluded from 1191/69, such as other tariff 
obligations, for instance on non-rail subsidiaries, and financial difficulties arising from excess 
capacity.  A number of railways receive support for tariff obligations under this heading. 
 
Despite these measures, the Commission perceived continued major problems in the rail transport 
field.  The most obvious of these is the continued loss of market share, particularly for 
international traffic.  But behind this was thought to lie a number of problems in terms of 
organisation and control: 
 
(i) The fact that rail operators were still largely nationally based, with complicated 
arrangements requiring inter company negotiations regarding through traffic between 
countries.  This is believed to affect the flexibility and quality of service offered to the 
customer, compared with situations in which the entire operation is under the control of a 
single operator. 
 
(ii) Growth in the level of financial support for rail services, together with the continuation of 
a system whereby compensation for social obligations was still largely provide ex post, 
with such compensation often being inadequate and not clearly identified with particular 
obligations.  At the same time railways still frequently had totally unrealistic balance 
sheets containing inherited debts which bear no relation to the earning power of their 
assets. 
 
(iii) Inadequacy in the capacity and quality of infrastructure, particularly regarding the ability 
to operate high speed passenger and combined transport freight services on international 
routes.  In some cases, the problem was a sheer lack of capacity, but more often it was 
difficulties such as inadequacies of speed and loading gauge.  Where bottlenecks on one 
system led to loss of traffic by its neighbours, the Community as a whole clearly had a 
special interest. 
 
(iv) Following on from this, there remained the general problem of technical harmonisation, 
for instance in terms of systems of signalling and electric traction, which lead to 
difficulties in terms of through running and mass production of rolling stock.  In the case 
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of the Iberian peninsula there is of course the particular problem of different track gauge 
from the rest of the community. 
 
In 1989, the Commission issued proposals for a radical shift in Community rail policy. (CEC, 
1989).  These comprised  the following: 
(i) Proposal for a Council Directive on the development of the Community Railways; 
(ii) Proposal for a Council Regulation on public service obligations (amending 1191/69); 
(iii) Proposal for a council Decision concerning the establishment of a network of high speed 
trains; 
(iv) Proposal for a Council Directive amending 75/130 on the establishment of common rules 
for certain types of combined carriage of goods between Member States. 
 
This section will comment on each in turn. 
 
(i) Development of the Community Railways 
 The key elements in this proposal required firstly increased commercial and financial 
independence and realistic balance sheets.  Secondly, and more controversially is the 
requirement for rail operators to establish separate divisions for infrastructure and 
operations, to require the infrastructure to be accessible to other operations, on fair and 
equal terms and to implement a system of charging for the use of infrastructure (based on 
train kilometres, speed, time, axle weight, etc) which facilitates this in the context of fair 
competition between modes 
 
(ii) Public Service Obligations 
 The aim of this amendment was to require replacement of generalised public service 
obligations by contracts, spelling out clearly the services to be provided and the prices and 
subsidies to apply.  The key issue is the extent to which a more formal contractual 
arrangement leads to a more transparent and effective relationship between government and 
railway. 
 
 (iii) High Speed Lines 
 The proposal here was aimed at ensuring compatibility between proposals of the Member 
States. Since then the Commission has taken a more proactive approach towards filling 
missing links to the Trans European Network (including that from London to the Channel 
Tunnel) and the funding of a multi-year European infrastructure programme (albeit on a 
limited scale) has made a contribution in this respect. 
 
(iv) Combined Transport 
 The key proposal here was to require governments to remit vehicle excise duty (VED) in 
respect of the period for which road goods vehicles are engaged in combined transport.  
Since VED is generally charged on tractor units, the remission applied only to the time 
such vehicles are on “rolling motorway” type trains (which can not operate in Britain 
because of the loading gauge, although they operate through the Channel Tunnel). 
 
These proposals were partly implemented in Directive 91/440.  Legal rights of access to railway 
infrastructure in EC countries were established for: 
 
 • international groupings of railway undertakings - defined as two or more operations from 
different countries wishing to run international services between the Member States where 
the undertakings are based 
• any railway undertaking wishing to run international combined transport goods services 
between any Member States. 
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However, by the time the Commission issued its next White Paper on Railways (CEC, 1996) 
relatively little progress had been made and virtually no open access operations had emerged.  
The Commission argued for stronger actions to open up the railways to market forces, including: 
 
• separation of infrastructure management and transport operations into distinct business 
units, rather than merely accounting  separation; 
• open access for all freight and international passenger services; 
• introduction of market forces into domestic passenger services, possibly by competitive 
franchising 
• establishment of ‘freight freeways’ with ‘one stop shops’ for access to the infrastructure. 
  
Whilst a number of countries have indeed separated infrastructure from operations and some 
(Great Britain, Germany, Netherlands) introduced open access, so far the effects remain small. 
Attempts by the Commission to secure agreement on wider liberalisation measures, such as open 
access operation for the whole of the rail freight market, have so far been unsuccessful. In 1998, 
the Commission published a draft Directive on rail infrastructure pricing and allocation of slots, 
designed to provide equal access for new entrants to the market, but it has yet to be implemented. 
 
The role of the Commission in local public transport has always been regarded as secondary to its 
role in long distance transport, and many of the Commissions measures explicitly exclude urban 
and suburban railways. Obviously the first concern has always been to promote international 
transport, and to ensure that charges for the transport of freight do not distort the terms of 
competition between member states. Neither of these arguments holds in the case of local public 
transport. Yet in 1995, the Commission issued a Green paper entitled ‘The Citizens Network’ 
dealing with exactly this issue (CEC, 1995a). 
 
The paper argues that it is important to make public transport more attractive, in order to reduce 
dependence on the car and to extend the transport choices of those without a car, available.  The 
role of the Commission in this is said to be to ‘inform, to promote and to enable.  In other words 
the Commission will undertake research and disseminate good practice. It also hints that other 
policy levers will be used - for instance it will favour for assistance with funding Trans European 
Network infrastructure which is well integrated into the local public transport network. 
 
One key issue in the view of the Commission is organisational. It argues that the best way of 
achieving efficient and attractive public transport which meets social needs and is well integrated 
is the competitive tendering of concessions to operate parts of the network.  This contrasts with 
both the British deregulated bus market and the typical continental publicly owned monopoly 
operator.  It is however more akin to the situation regarding buses in London, as well as the 
franchising of rail passenger services throughout Great Britain. 
 
 
3. RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE PRICING 
 
It has long been the declared aim of the  commission that pricing policies should be developed 
which promote economic efficiency. This requires prices which reflect marginal social cost. 
Originally, this was seen mainly in terms of charging for the use of infrastructure according to 
marginal operation and maintenance costs, but more recently the concern with environmental 
problems has led to an emphasis on the external costs of transport as well - congestion, accidents 
and environmental costs.  
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In 1995 the Commission published a Green Paper entitled ‘Towards Fair and Efficient 
Pricing’(CEC, 1995b). 
 
The basic argument of this paper was as follows: 
 
• prices should reflect costs 
• some costs – environmental, accidents, congestion and infrastructure provision and 
maintenance – are only partly covered or not covered at all 
• these costs could be very large - 250b ecu p.a. 
 
The following White Paper (CEC 1998) explicitly adopted the target of marginal social cost 
pricing, and set out a timetable for its phased introduction.  But the argument as to how this could 
be implemented in the case of rail transport, and indeed that as to whether it was desirable at all, 
continues. One of the reasons for this debate is the fact that rail infrastructure charges are seen as 
relevant to a number of policy objectives. These objectives will be reviewed before the key 
alternatives put forward are considered further. 
 
Overview of Objectives 
 
A number of different objectives for rail infrastructure charges may be identified.  A typical 
list, drawn from those put forward at the ECMT’s 107th Round Table on Transport 
Economics (ECMT Round Table 107, 1998). which was devoted to the issue of User Charges 
for Railway Infrastructure, would be: 
 
• promoting efficient use of the infrastructure 
• promoting efficient investment in and development of the infrastructure 
• recovering the costs of providing the infrastructure, including adequate funding for 
investment. 
• promoting  efficiency of operators, for instance through facilitating competition 
• harmonisation of the terms of competition between modes 
 
Not all these objectives can be adequately fulfilled with a single policy instrument.  At the 
ECMT’s 107th Round Table there was general agreement that the most important objective 
was efficient use of the infrastructure, although this should be achieved in the way which 
least damaged other objectives, in terms for instance of incentives for efficient development 
of the network and the scope for promoting competition amongst train operators.  
 
The first part of this section will provide a general review based around the objectives set out 
above and drawing on the papers and discussion at ECMT’s 107th Round Table.  We will 
then look at the key alternative approaches to be found in the ever-growing literature on this 
issue.  
Efficient use and development of infrastructure 
 
The basic principles for the efficient use of infrastructure are that, in the absence of capacity 
constraints, operators willing to pay the extra costs they impose by their use of the 
infrastructure should be allowed to use it, whilst in the presence of capacity constraints the 
capacity should go to the operator and type of traffic for which it has the most value. This of 
course does presupppose that what the operator is willing to pay represents the social value of 
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the train, so that any external benefits or costs have already been taken account of by taxes or 
subsidies from the government. 
 
This approach to pricing is essentially that labelled by economists as short run marginal cost 
pricing; in other words charging the incremental cost of use of the existing infrastructure by 
the train concerned.  This would cover the wear and tear cost, plus any costs imposed on 
other services in terms of delays or retiming to accommodate the train concerned. In the 
presence of a capacity constraint, this cost would have added to it the value of any train 
which could not be run as a result of lack of capacity. 
 
This concept is often contrasted with that of long run marginal cost, which represents the 
additional cost of an extra train when the infrastructure is optimally adapted to the demand in 
question. It is well known that if the infrastructure were optimally configured, the two 
concepts would give the same resulting value, since the infrastructure would be improved to 
the point at which the cost of the extra capacity exactly matched its value in terms of 
relieving congestion and permitting additional trains to run. The general perception that short 
run marginal cost is below long run is only true in the presence of excess capacity; the 
reverse is true when capacity is scarce. 
 
In practice, indivisibilities and the time lags involved in adapting infrastructure to volume 
mean that differences between short and long run marginal cost are likely. In this case, the 
theoretically correct approach is to price at short run marginal cost, whilst adapting the 
infrastructure in accordance with the outcome of social cost-benefit analysis of alternative 
schemes. In this way, the optimal use of existing infrastructure can be guaranteed, whilst over 
time, the quantity and quality of infrastructure would be optimised, and the price adapted 
accordingly. It is also arguably easier to measure short run marginal cost than long run, 
which - in the presence of indivisibilities - may only be approximated as the average 
incremental cost of specific capacity enhancing measures which may vary greatly in cost 
from place to place.  However, strong arguments in favour of the long run marginal cost 
pricing are also put forward. Specifically it may give a value which is more stable over time, 
not fluctuating with day to day changes in the level of congestion, and thus aid planning by 
the train operating company. Linked to this is the fact that many operators, both freight and 
passenger,  seek contracts running for a number of years in order to justify specific 
investments in rolling stock or fixed equipment such as terminals. One solution might be to 
charge long term contracts on the basis of long run marginal cost, but to sell paths on the 
‘spot’ market at short run marginal cost.  
 
This would also help overcome the problem of short run marginal cost pricing that it makes it 
more profitable for a commercial rail infrastructure company to constrain capacity to force 
the price up  than to invest in expansion. At least if it is regulated to charge long run marginal 
cost this incentive is removed, although it is still not clear that the appropriate  incentive to 
invest will exist. It may be far more appropriate therefore if long run marginal cost pricing is 
seen as part of a long run contract which also specifies the infrastructure investment to take 
place, although such contracts may be difficult to negotiate if several operators are involved. 
 
It may also be doubted whether it really is the case that short run marginal cost is easier to 
measure than long, particularly in the context of capacity constraints, where alternative 
operators’ valuations of the slots concerned  must be appraised. In point of fact, the 
Commission appears to have adopted a compromise whereby short run marginal cost is the 
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basis of charging, but the average incremental cost of new capacity rather than the 
opportunity cost of the slots should be the basis of charging for capacity constrained sections.  
 
Budget constraints 
 
It is generally agreed that railways are subject to economies of traffic density such that any 
form of marginal cost pricing will typically fail to recover the total cost of providing, 
maintaining and operating the infrastructure. One solution to this is a contribution from the 
state.  However, some see this as dangerous in terms of the incentives to efficiency; some as 
inequitable and some fear that it might prove inadequate to fund an appropriate level of 
investment. In any event it is generally accepted that government funds have a shadow price 
above one, so that it is appropriate to seek to recover more than simply the marginal cost of 
infrastructure use from rail operators. 
 
In order to achieve this with the least possible damage to efficiency, the standard Ramsey 
pricing argument would justify raising price above marginal cost in inverse proportion to the 
elasticity of demand for the service in question.   However, it would be difficult to do this in 
a fixed tariff for more than a limited number of categories of train. Much finer differentiation 
would be possible if individual negotiations between infrastructure provider and train 
operator were permitted. It should also be pointed out that the application of Ramsey pricing 
to an intermediate good is not straightforward; it is the effect on the prices and service 
patterns in the final market that matter, and that is difficult to predict and appropriately allow 
for. 
 
The generally advocated alternative to Ramsey pricing is two part tariffs ( of course, the two 
may be combined as well).  The attraction of two part tariffs is that the fixed part may be 
related to ability to pay, but still leave the operator free to raise the necessary cash in the way 
that loses them the least traffic, without the distorting effect on service levels that a surcharge 
on the charge per train kilometre has.  The difficulty is that if the fixed part is the result of a 
tariff, it almost inevitably favours large operators against small  (even if there is a fixed 
charge per route kilometre, as in France and Germany, it favours the operators who have a lot 
of traffic on the particular route, although it is not as damaging to the prospects of entrants as 
a large fixed  charge for an entire network, as in Britain). 
 
Promoting competition 
 
The generally advocated position regarding promoting competition is that tariffs should be 
simple, transparent and not discriminate between operators. This immediately conflicts with 
some of the earlier considerations, which suggested that charging for peak capacity, 
investment and price differentiation may all be best implemented by means of individual 
negotiations between infrastructure provider and train operator.   
 
It seems that this is the area in which the most obvious trade off is to be made. If it is really 
seen as crucial to have a simple transparent tariff to promote new entry, then a good deal in 
terms of efficiency of the use and development of the network may have to be sacrificed. On  
the other hand, if new competition is less of an issue, perhaps because competition for the 
market in the form of a franchising system is seen as the most effective way of promoting 
efficiency in operations, rather than competition in the market,  then perhaps simplicity and 
transparency are not so important. 
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One suggestion is that if there were any discrimination, it should favour new operators, as 
they face other barriers to entry in any event. Making paths available at short run marginal 
cost to new operators might therefore be appropriate. This is consistent with offering paths at 
short run marginal cost on the spot market, whilst negotiating a  higher rate for longer 
contracts, although in this case the benefit new operators received from a lower price might 
be outweighed by the increased uncertainty about long term access.  
 
The Commission appears to have concluded that it is in the freight market that new entry is 
most important  and that rail is in the weakest competitive position. Thus it proposes that for 
freight, a strictly marginal cost pricing approach should be adopted with no supplementary 
measures to raise additional revenue. 
 
Harmonisation across modes 
 
A number of speakers at the Round Table spoke of the need to harmonise pricing systems 
between modes to achieve a level playing field. That is of course an important efficiency 
objective, and a failure to follow efficient pricing rules on competing modes will certainly 
influence the appropriate pricing rule for rail. One confusion should be avoided however. It is 
not the case that a failure to follow efficient pricing on road or air transport leads to a case for 
adopting the same inefficiencies on rail, and it is certainly not the case that one should aim 
for the same relationship between revenue and total cost on all modes.  The ratio of marginal 
social cost to average cost differs between modes and so would the ideal ratio of revenue to 
total cost. Distortions on one mode certainly lead to a case for varying the price on other 
modes from marginal social cost, but it will only be optimal for the ratio of the prices to equal 
the ratio of marginal social cost if there is a fixed amount of traffic to allocate between the 
modes. This is certainly not true of passenger traffic although it may be a more reasonable 
approximation for freight. For passenger traffic there is a trade off. Lowering price on rail to 
offset underpricing on road or air will have the benefit of attracting passengers to divert, but a 
cost in terms of generating new passengers who value the benefits at less than the marginal 
social cost. The higher the ratio of generated traffic to diverted the closer the price of rail 
should stay to marginal social cost.   
 
It will be seen from the above, that whilst greatly illuminating the issues, theoretical 
considerations alone cannot resolve the question of the most appropriate approach to 
charging for the use of rail infrastructure. Much depends on the institutional setting in terms 
of ownership, competition and regulation, and there are still trade-offs to be made which will 
vary from case to case.  
 
The key alternatives 
 
So far the discussion in this section has rested heavily on the papers and discussion at ECMT 
Round Table 107. There are many other studies of this issue, including studies for the 
Commission and for the Community of European Railways, which will be referred to in what 
follows. It has already been seen that there are broadly two approaches to this problem. 
 
The first relies on pure marginal cost pricing, with subsidies to cover the difference between 
this and average cost. This approach is advocated by Roy (1998).  It is relatively 
straightforward to estimate the marginal cost in terms of wear and tear and accelerated 
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renewals of additional train services. Unplanned delays caused to other operators may be 
charged for by the ex post payment of compensation, as under the Railtrack performance 
regime in Britain (OPRAF, 1996), or by ex ante prices developed by means of simulation 
using models such as the MERIT model of Railtrack (The modelling approach is claimed to 
be superior, as it identifies the full congestion cost of additional trains on the network, 
including the impact of reduced recovery possibilities from delays with other causes, whereas 
actual measurement is confined to delays directly caused by the train in question).  Extra 
pollution also can be forecast, and valued as discussed for instance in CAPRI (1998).  The 
big issue is how to charge for the 'opportunity cost' of scarce track capacity. Of course this 
only really becomes an issue where there is more than one train operator; with only one 
operator such costs are internalised in any case.  
 
The most attractive solution to this problem in theory is to 'auction' scarce slots. There are 
many practical difficulties however, including the complicated ways in which slots can be put 
together to produce a variety of types of service, and the possibility of lack of adequate 
competition to ensure a competitive price. In practice it is therefore usually accepted that any 
degree of price rationing of scarce slots will have to be on the basis of administered prices 
rather than bid prices, although it might be possible to allow for a degree of ‘secondary 
trading’ in which slots change hands between operators at enhanced prices, and/or to organise 
a degree of bidding for prepackaged  sets of slots. 
 
A second possibility is to simply impose a price and see what happens to demand, and then 
iterate until demand equals capacity. The risk is, however, that serious distortions may occur 
whilst the price is adjusting, and that strategic game playing may occur to force the price 
down by withholding demand, where competition is not strong. 
 
A third approach, recommended by NERA (1998) and endorsed by the Commission, in its 
proposed Directive,  is to identify sections of infrastructure where capacity is constrained and 
to charge the long run average incremental cost of expanding capacity. However, this is a 
very difficult concept to measure (the cost of expanding capacity varies enormously 
according to the exact proposal considered, and it is not easy to relate this to the number of 
paths created, since they depend on the precise number and order of trains run). However, 
this appears to be a popular approach and is under consideration, for instance, in both Britain 
(ORR, 1998) and France, at least for modest capacity enhancement measures as opposed to 
major projects. 
 
Given the difficulties with all these approaches, it may be that the best way of handling the 
issue is to permit direct negotiation between operators and the infrastructure manager over 
the price and allocation of slots, including investment in new or upgraded capacity. It is 
appreciated that it is difficult to ensure that this does not lead to the abuse of monopoly 
power, particularly when the infrastructure manager and the operator are part of the same 
company. An independent regulator is certainly needed but their job is far from easy. 
   
A rather different approach is to charge operators prices that collectively cover the full cost 
of provision of the infrastructure, with any subsidies being channeled to the train operators. It 
is generally accepted as desirable that the prices of individual slots remain as close as 
possible to marginal cost (second best theory suggests that any divergences from marginal 
cost pricing, such as Ramsey pricing, are better applied in the final product market than on 
the intermediate good of transport infrastructure - Diamond and Mirrlees, 1971). Thus the 
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obvious solution is the application of two-part tariffs, with the fixed part reflecting the 
avoidable cost imposed by the operator concerned plus some allocation of joint costs. Such a 
two part tariff exists for the franchised passenger operators in Britain (ORR, 1994), and a 
similar type of tariff was subsequently negotiated by the major freight operator (ORR, 1997) 
 
The problem with this approach is, of course, how to determine a fixed charge for new 
operators that will not discourage them from entry if they are more efficient than existing 
operators but will conversely not give them an advantage over existing efficient operators. 
The theoretical answer again is well known but difficult to implement - it is to charge them  
an amount equal to any surplus over avoidable costs that they take away from existing 
operators. (Baumol, 1983). In the absence of the necessary knowledge to implement this, it 
may be reasonable to allow entrants to choose between paying on the same two part tariff as 
incumbents (with the fixed part being a charge per route kilometre, so that overall size per se 
does not give the incumbent an advantage on any particular route) or paying the average cost 
per train kilometre paid by the incumbent. This at least represents the level of surplus that on 
average the incumbent is required to earn. It is broadly the approach recommended by 
Cooper and Lybrand (1998) and now being adopted in Germany.      
 
By contrast, an approach based on charging average costs for all slots may be much simpler, 
but it does run the risk of discouraging provision of services which could more than cover 
their marginal cost. This was a serious criticism of the approach originally adopted to track 
access pricing in Germany (Link, 1998). 
 
Whichever of the above systems of charging is implemented will leave an issue as to the 
incentive given to infrastructure providers to adapt the quantity and quality of the 
infrastructure to future needs. This is perhaps most readily addressed via the ‘two-part’ tariff 
approach, whereby changes in the infrastructure required by operators or subsidy providers 
may be reflected in changes in the fixed element of the two part tariff. Again, it would seem 
difficult to do this in any way other than by the negotiation of a commercial contract between 
the two parties. 
  
4. PRICING OF RAIL SERVICES 
 
By contrast with infrastructure pricing, relatively few studies deal with the principles to be 
adopted in the pricing of rail and other public transport  services. On of the few studies that 
do consider this issue is PETS (1998). 
 
According to this, the marginal cost of handling additional rail traffic comprises the 
additional operating costs plus any additional infrastructure costs; providing that one of the 
above recommended approaches to infrastructure pricing has been adopted the latter will be 
appropriately reflected in additional charges paid by the train operator for use of the 
infrastructure, as will external costs such as environmental effects. However, it also includes 
the marginal cost imposed on other rail users. Where increased traffic leads to a more 
frequent service, this effect will be negative.  
 
The marginal cost of carrying extra traffic will probably be lowest where it is possible to 
increase capacity simply by operating longer trains. Even if more trains have to be operated 
however, their extra cost will partly be offset by resulting improvements in the timetable for 
existing customers. This effect is likely to be greater for passengers than freight, and for short 
distance services than long, since any inconvenience of not having a train at exactly the 
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desired time is a greater part of generalised cost the shorter the journey. The marginal cost of 
additional capacity is obviously likely to be greater in the peak, when capacity is fully 
utilised, than in the off peak when it is not. Charging extra for scarce infrastructure slots will 
reinforce this difference between peak and off peak charges. 
 
A pure marginal cost pricing approach would therefore differentiate between peak and off 
peak, as well as between other determinants of marginal cost such as the quality of rolling 
stock and on-board services provided. To the extent that the financial performance of such a 
regime is unacceptable, price differentiation is likely to be the appropriate way forward. In 
the freight sector, it is possible to differentiate to a high degree, since many customers are 
large enough to make it worth negotiating an individual price. Provided that any 
infrastructure charges are appropriate, this may leave little case for further subsidies for rail 
freight services, except on second best grounds if road haulage is not appropriately priced.  
For passenger services, differentiation can take place in terms of origin, destination, class and 
time of travel, person type (e.g. pensioner, child, family group)  and when the booking was 
made (at least in terms of longer trips where booking ahead may be reasonable). But such 
differentiation will almost inevitably be cruder than for freight, because it is not feasible to 
negotiate  a separate price with each passenger. 
 
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
When the Commission first embarked on a policy of promoting internalsation of externalities 
through marginal social cost pricing, it was widely believed that the effect would be to assist 
the rail mode share because of its much lower level of external cost. A number of research 
studies undertaken as part of the EU 4th Framework have now produced empirical results 
which enable this proposition to be tested.   
 
Of these, STEMM conducted a number of case studies of both passenger and freight traffic 
with an emphasis on multimodal traffic.  Scenarios including both pricing to internalise 
externalities and infrastructure investment were tested, and some general conclusions may be 
drawn.  The results suggest some benefit to rail from full internalisation of costs on other 
modes, but that improvement of rail service quality is more important. Infrastructure 
improvements should be combined with environmental charges in order to generate greater 
benefits for rail and intermodal transport.  
 
A key part of the TRENEN II project involved the development and implementation of the 
TRENEN urban and inter-regional models, numerical static optimisation models designed to 
analyse the welfare implications of various transport pricing and regulatory policies. Taking 
infrastructure as given, both types of model were designed to measure the gap between 
present and efficient prices for all modes and the potential of the different pricing instruments 
in improving transport pricing. The different pricing reform scenarios were compared with 
two benchmarks: the reference case, corresponding to unchanged pricing policies, and the 
optimal pricing scenario. The results from four urban case studies (Amsterdam, Brussels, 
London, and Dublin) and two interregional case studies (Belgium and Ireland) are 
summarised below. 
 
In the urban case studies, as expected, peak car prices were found to be well below their 
efficient level;  off peak  car prices were more efficient.  The change required in bus and rail 
fares varied with the current level of subsidy, but tended also to be upwards.  Nevertheless, 
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rail would certainly gain market share.  This was not necessarily so, however, in the 
interregional case studies, where in Belgium, and especially Ireland, it was estimated that – 
because current rail subsidies were excessive – a move to efficient pricing of freight traffic 
would induce a further switch of traffic to road.  
 
Five case studies relating to strategic transport routes in Europe are being carried out within 
the PETS project. These case studies assess the practical consequences of moving to a more 
appropriate price structure and level (ie prices for transport use which more effectively reflect 
the social costs that transport users impose on others) and the implications for modal shares for 
the year 2010 under several different local environments.  
 
The main feature of the marginal social cost pricing policy scenarios appears to be that, 
whilst the price of car is not significantly changed, the prices of bus and train trips are lower 
than those in the ‘business as usual’ (BAU) situation, because existing pricing is aimed at 
cost revovery rather than efficiency.  This decreases car mileage slightly and increases public 
transport mileage.  Another feature is that, because they are a relatively substantial source of 
external effects, the costs of heavy goods vehicles in all three scenarios are higher than in the 
BAU situation.  This leads to a situation in which the use of rail for freight transport is more 
attractive.  
 
The differences in conclusions from these in TRENEN may well be because PETS case 
studies tend to be in countries with such lower existing rail subsidies than the TRENEN inter-
regional case studies. 
 
None of the above case studies considers the issue of peak pricing for rail services. However, 
PETS D2 does discuss the results of earlier work by Jansson. This concludes that appropriate 
peak pricing is very important in the passenger market. This plus provision of subsidies to 
allow passenger prices to reflect economies of scale provides  big social benefits. 
 
From these case studies some overall conclusions may be drawn: 
 
(i) whilst a move to more efficient pricing will benefit rail market share in a lot of 
circumstances, particularly in urban areas, this is not invariably the case.  In some 
cases, excessive subsidies mean that efficient pricing will raise rail charges to the 
extent that rail loses market share to road; 
 
(ii) it is often the case that improving rail quality of service and investment in rail 
infrastructure are more important for rail market share than internalisation of 
externalitities.   This appears to be particularly true for freight. 
 
6. RAIL REFORM IN PRACTICE 
 
In this section we will concentrate on those European railways where the pace of change has 
been fastest – Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and Great Britain. In most others, the basic 
step of separating infrastructure from operations, at least in an accounting sense, has taken 
place, and in some – such as France – a separate infrastructure manager has been established. 
But at the practical level it does not appear that these reforms have had much effect to date. 
 
Germany 
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Before January 1 1994, German railways came under two national organisations, Deutsche 
Bundesbahn (DB-former West German railway) and Deutsche Reichsbahn (DR-former East 
German railway), both operating in their former territories.  They now operate as a single 
company, Deutsche Bahn AG (German Rail plc), and have been split into an entrepreneurial 
area with three commercial businesses (responsible for passenger, freight and infrastructure) 
and a public sector one (responsible for other tasks), with an ultimate aim of privatising the 
former, but probably not until well after the year 2000.  A new organisation was created, a 
Federal Railway Office, to handle state tasks such as approving construction plans for a new 
railway line.  The rest of the public area remained in the Federal Railway Property.   
 
From the point of view of the introduction of competition, there are two key developments. 
The first is the regionalisation of local passenger services.  This process transfers the power 
to determine local rail services and the responsibility to finance them from a national to a 
regional level (to state governments known as Lander).  This is a key feature of the 
restructuring process, see Ridley and Terry (1992).  Previously, the Lander were a powerful 
lobby for the retention and improvement of rail services, payment for which came from 
Federal funds.  Now the Lander have to set a service level and enter into a contract with a 
railway operator. For this, they receive funding from the Federal government, which can be 
used to provide rail or road transport. They are entitled to franchise these out to operators 
other than DBAG, and already, some regional services have been franchised to private 
railways, or to consortia including DBAG and private railways (Germany has always had a 
number of private local railways, often operating passenger services under contract to local 
authorities). 
 
The second key feature is the introduction of open access. In principle this is available to all 
freight and passenger operations (though in the case of foreign operators only on a reciprocal 
basis). Charges are set by the infrastructure division of DBAG but regulated by the Federal 
Railway Office. Charges for the use of the infrastructure are based on a tariff which varies 
with the nature of the rolling stock and of the route, and the length of the contract, and is 
designed to cover all costs other than those investment costs borne by the state. Initially, this 
tariff involved a high marginal cost for additional train kilometres and a large quantity 
discount which greatly favoured DBAG. Following protests from the states, a lower marginal 
charge for additional train kilometres has now been introduced, and the charging system 
modified into a two part tariff (Link, 1997). 
 
Whilst there is now in theory complete open access for third parties in Germany, the nature of 
the access charging regime (high charges, and a quantity discount favouring the existing large 
operator) has discouraged entry, and only a handful of private freight operators have taken 
advantage of this possibility. Mostly these have been existing short haul private railways. 
 
Netherlands 
 
For many years up to the early 1990s railways in the Netherlands were subject to a high 
degree of government intervention at every level.  Netherlands Railways (NS) did not have 
the freedom to decide its own fares, levels of service or investment plans. This type of 
arrangement was as a result of the Dutch government’s concern for a national strategic 
transport plan. However, several events led to reform in public transport administration, 
resulting in a more market oriented independent NS. These events included the report of the 
Wijffels Committee (1992), which urged the government to give NS more scope to operate as 
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an independent business, and to create distinct organisational divisions within NS, as well as 
European policy measures. 
 
The gist of the government’s reforms is that NS will retain full responsibility for the 
operation of rail services, with the freedom to set levels of service, fares and investment 
necessary for operations.  All other aspects of rail provision such as infrastructure 
management will be managed by the government or the government via a third party.  
Passenger services are being separated into commercial and social, with the latter subject to 
competitive franchising.  NS commercial passenger services will eventually be privatised. NS 
Freight has complete commercial freedom, and is able to set freight rates as it chooses.  It is 
now proposed to merge the freight operations of NS with those of DBAG, creating the first of 
what are expected to be two or three major international rail freight operators dominating the 
European scene. 
 
Currently there is open access to the infrastructure at zero charge, although it is proposed to 
introduce charges in the year 2000. New entry has nevertheless been limited to a small 
number of freight services, and a single passenger operator (Lovers Rail) which forms the 
only open access passenger operator of which we are aware anywhere in Western Europe to 
operate in competition with the incumbent rather than on a franchise basis. 
 
Sweden 
 
Until 1979 the Swedish railways network operated without subsidy, and the whole rail 
system was one of the most efficient and cost effective in Western Europe (BRB and The 
University of Leeds, 1979).  However, in the eighties concern about falling market share and 
increasing subsidies led to the 1988 Transportation Act. 
 
This act was based upon a r`oad model’ under which:   
(a) The rail network was divided into a trunk system of main arteries and  
 county lines. 
(b) Rail infrastructure became the responsibility of a new state agency Banverket (BV), 
who leased track access to train operators on a marginal social cost basis.  BV has 
responsibility for new investment, maintenance and acts as regulator over safety and 
scheduling matters. 
(c) Statens Jarnvagar (SJ) became a train operating and marketing organisation, for both 
passenger and freight operations.  It retained ownership of terminals and rolling stock, 
also maintaining operating rights over trunk routes for passenger traffic, and trunk 
and county routes for freight traffic (excluding iron ore). 
(d) The 24 county public transport authorities (CTA’s) would  set the level of passenger 
service to be operated on county lines and could choose contractors other than SJ to 
operate local and regional services. 
(e) If SJ or the CTA’s did not wish to exploit their transportation rights (not run a 
service) then the  government (trunk lines) and BV (other lines) can award such rights 
to other operators. 
(f) Infrastructure charges paid by train operators would be consistent with the pricing 
regime employed by the road authority, namely marginal social cost. 
(g) The state would provide grants for new investment. 
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Initially all train operators paid an access charge equal to the marginal social cost.  The 
charge was in two parts (i) a fixed element, expressed as a rate per rail vehicle axle (ii) a 
variable element, related to vehicle tonne-km, differentiated by type of vehicle to reflect 
different amounts of wear and tear on the track structures.  The charge also includes 
environmental costs (diesel exhaust pollution) and accidents.  However, the charges for 
freight traffic have since been abolished on the argument that this counteracts the effects of 
undercharging for road freight. 
 
Initially two principal challenges arose to SJ’s monopoly of provision, BK-Tag and Linjetag.  
Both operated bus services under contract for CTAs in south and central Sweden and provide 
maintenance services for other bus companies.  Although both firms bid for contracts, only 
BK-Tag was successful in winning contracts in (1) Smaland and Halland (1990) and (2) 
Borlange (1992). 
 
SJ responded to the competition by cutting its tender prices by an average of 30%, and 
regained the contract from BK-Tag.  However these results have encouraged the Swedish 
government to the extent that they are extending the franchise system to regional and longer 
distance services. An international consortium including BK-Tag has now won two major 
franchises  - the Stockholm commuter servies and the West Coast Main Line, again at 
substantially lower prices than those bid by SJ, (indeed in the latter case without subsidy). 
 
Great Britain 
 
After strong improvements in the later 1980s, the performance of British Rail began to 
deteriorate in the early 1990s.  The then Conservative government saw its policy of 
privatisation as having been very successful and determined to extend this policy to rail. The 
process was virtually complete by the time it lost power to the Labour Party in May 1997. 
 
A key feature of privatisation in Britain has been a degree of vertical separation unparallelled 
elsewhere. The intention is to create competitive markets for the supply of inputs into the 
production of rail servicers wherever possible, even when the services themselves remain a 
monopoly. Whereever monopoly is involved, continued public regulation takes place by an 
independent regulator.  
 
The infrastructure has been placed in the hands of a new company (Railtrack) which was 
privatised in the form of the sale of shares in May 1996. Passenger rolling stock was placed 
in the hands of three companies, now privatised by outright sale, which lease it to the 
operators. Passenger train operations were placed in the hands of 25 train operating 
companies, and their management franchised out for periods of 7-15 years (the longer periods 
being applicable where major investment was required). Since they lease stations and rolling 
stock, and pay for access to the tracks owned by Railtrack, these companies generally own 
virtually no assets; this was of course a deliberate attempt to remove one substantial barrier to 
entry. Track renewal and maintenance work and rolling stock heavy maintenance was placed 
in the hands of a number of companies which were then sold outright, and now have to 
compete for the contracts to undertake this work. A recent update of experience so far is 
contained in Nash (1997). 
 
Two new government bodies were created - the Office of Passenger Rail Franchising 
(OPRAF), which is responsible for franchising out passenger services, and the Office of the 
Rail Regulator (ORR) which has various duties the most important being the licencing of 
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train operators and regulation of the prices and terms of track access agreements. OPRAF 
specifies minimum service levels and (for certain categories of fare) maximum fares and then 
invites bids in terms of the minimum subsidy required for each year of the franchise.  
 
Currently, open access for passenger services is limited to routes with no through service or 
which account for a very small part of the franchisee's income. This was to protect 
franchisees and thus ease the franchising process. Some competition does exist, however, 
where two or more franchises serve the same pair of points, and price competition has broken 
out in a number of corridors. The Regulator has declared his intention of progressively 
moving to increased open access over the period 1999-2002, and there is considerable 
interest in new open access operations.  From September 1999, competition will be allowed 
for up to 20% of each franchisee’s revenue, provided that the Regulator is satisfied that this 
will benefit consumers and not merely duplicate existing services.  There is complete open 
access in the freight sector, at negotiated access charges. These are subject to the approval of 
the Regulator, who has the power to reduce them if he regards them as unreasonable; he does 
this with reference to the 'stand-alone' costs of freight service. After three years of open 
access, only two new freight operators have appeared, both hauling their own traffic over 
short distances on a single route (one of these has since sold out to the main freight operator 
in order to realise the economics of pooling their equipment). 
 
The immediate effect of the reform was a large increase in subsidies resulting from the move 
to the train operating companies paying commercial rates for the use of infrastructure and 
rolling stock.  However, these charges both enabled the government to sell these businesses 
for several billion pounds and provided adequate income to fund replacement investment, 
which previous subsidies had failed fully to do.  The franchising process itself  has been 
hailed as a major success, with franchises awarded to a number of new entrants to the railway 
industry (mainly but not exclusively from the bus industry) committing themselves to 
improved services with a halving of subsidies over a seven year period.  These new entrants 
essentially take control of the existing operating company, including its staff, but are then 
free to negotiate changes in wages and conditions. On the other hand, there have been 
problems with some franchisees failing to achieve their required performance standards, and 
Railtrack failing to achieve the expected levels of investment.  In the former case, the 
franchise agreement provides for penalty payments, but in the latter the Regulator has had to 
take additional powers to force Railtrack to produce and to adher to appropriate investment 
plans. 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The Common Transport Policy has made enormous strides in the past decade.  Much has 
been done to open up road haulage and air transport to competition, and a start has been made 
on reforming the railways.  However, there remain serious problems ahead.  There is so far 
no agreement on how to internalise externalities into transport prices, and there is strong 
opposition to doing so from a number of member states.  The pace of change in the rail sector 
remains slow, and the long desired improvement in its performance is only coming through in 
patches.  Finally over much of the Union nothing has yet been done to introduce competitive 
bidding for the operation of local public transport; although in many countries a high quality 
network already exists it is at high public expense. 
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Regarding pricing policies, we have seen that marginal social cost pricing would certainly 
benefit rail market share in urban areas, and on long distance passenger services particularly 
at the expense of air.  The evidence for freight is more mixed however;  in some cases, 
removal of excessive subsidies could actually switch traffic to road.  What is more important 
for rail mode share, particularly for freight traffic, is to increase efficiency and quality of 
service.  That is what open access was intended to do. 
 
We have seen however that despite the efforts of the Commission, little has been achieved in 
terms of introducing on-track competition in the rail sector.  What has been achieved in some 
cases is a combination of commercialisation, deregulation and even privatisation, together 
with deregulation increasing competition from other modes.  Experience to date suggests that 
attempts to introduce on-track competition or to make rail markets contestable, will have 
limited success, especially where the incumbent operator controls the infrastructure.  This 
might suggest that any solution should involve separating infrastructure from operations in 
different companies.  However, there are advantages in terms of planning and investment in 
continued integration of infrastructure and operations, so the case is not clearcut. 
 
There is a  much better record of success with franchising arrangements for passenger 
services which involve competition for the market rather than in the market. Competitive 
bidding forces companies to reveal information about costs which they will conceal under a 
traditional regulatory regime.  What is less clear is what form of franchising (short or long 
contracts, vertically integrated or operations only) is best.  It is also the case that such an 
approach is likely to involve the continued need for extensive government regulation of the 
sector. Prices and conditions of access to the infastructure; prices, levels and quality of 
passenger service and the relations between passenger operators in terms of though ticketing, 
information and connections, are all likely to require continuing regulation given that 
operations are undertaken by a franchised monopoly.   All these are features of the current 
British approach, which deserves continued careful observation as the most radical attempt to 
find an alternative approach to rail provision to the traditional vertically-integrated railway. 
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